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Thirty Years After Michael E. Porter: What Do We
Know About Business Exit?
by Carolin Decker and Thomas Mellewigt
Executive Overview
Although a business exit is an important corporate change initiative, the buyer’s side seems to be more
appealing to management researchers than the seller’s because acquisitions imply growth, i.e., success. Yet
from an optimistic viewpoint, business exit can effectively create value for the selling company. In this
paper we attempt to bring the relevance of the seller’s side back into our consciousness by asking: What do
we know about business exit? We start our exploration with Porter (1976), focusing on literature that
investigates the antecedents of, barriers to, and outcomes of business exit. We also include studies from related
fields such as finance and economics.1 Through this research we determine three clusters of findings: factors
promoting business exit, exit barriers, and exit outcomes. Overall, it is the intention of this paper to highlight
the importance of business exit for research and practice. Knowing what we know about business exits and
their high financial value we should bear in mind that exit need not mean failure but a new beginning for
a corporation.
Business exit is an asset restructuring activityinvolving a diversified firm’s divestiture of oneof its businesses, such as Intel’s abandonment
of its DRAM business (Burgelman, 1996). Interest
in this topic can be traced back to publications
that represent milestones in economic research
such as Bain (1956), who established the concept
of barriers to entry, Caves’ (1964) analysis of the
American industry, and the seminal article on exit
barriers by Porter published in California Manage-
ment Review in 1976, which helped raise the in-
terest in business exit among a broad audience.
Data from the U.S. illustrate that business exit
continues to be relevant (cf. Figure 1). In the
U.S., business services, real estate, and software
were the most active divesting industries in 2005.
A recent study by the consulting company Accen-
ture highlights the growing relevance of business
exits for years to come and predicts that “[f]or the
next years, many companies will give far more
thought to divestitures than they did in the late
1990s” (Anslinger, Jenk, & Chanmugam, 2003).
Although a business exit is an important cor-
porate change initiative, the buyer’s side seems to
be more appealing to management researchers
than the seller’s because acquisitions imply
growth, i.e., success. This preference for the “suc-
cess” side can be seen at the industry level as well.
Managers, for example, may resist business exit
because it is afflicted with the stigma of failure and
is often seen as a result of poor corporate manage-
ment. The reluctance of managers to admit that
their organization or at least parts of it are in
trouble is evidence of their substantial personal
preoccupation with growth and their large per-
sonal costs in case of exit (Gilson, 1989). Yet from
an optimistic point of view, business exit can
effectively create value for the selling company.
Indeed, the stigma certainly wasn’t a factor for
former GE CEO Jack Welch. Under his leader-
ship, 117 business units which amounted to 20%
of GE’s corporate assets were divested within only
four years (Dranikoff, Koller, & Schneider, 2002).
1 We thank two anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to enrich our
literature base from management research with a broader range of publi-
cations from different but related fields.
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In this paper we attempt to bring the relevance of
the seller’s side back into our consciousness and
ask: What do we know about business exit?
Starting with Porter (1976), our literature re-
view draws on publications which investigate the
antecedents of, barriers to, and outcomes of business
exit and which have been published especially in
management journals since 1976. For the identi-
fication of relevant articles, we used the Business
Source Premier Database and focused our search
on the keywords ‘restructuring,’ ‘exit,’ ‘divesti-
ture,’ and ‘divestment.’ In order to enrich our
literature base derived from management research,
we included studies from related fields such as
finance and economics.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the first
section outlines the various facets of the topic and
its embeddedness in the field of strategy. The next
sections focus on antecedents, barriers, and out-
comes of business exit. We will show that the
antecedents of business exit are not only financial
in nature but also include strategic, governance,
and environmental issues, and are interrelated
with the outcomes of business exit. The latter
include financial and strategic aspects and effects
on employees, management, and ownership struc-
ture as well as consequences for the divested unit.
In the last section we will summarize our findings
in three clusters: factors promoting business exit, exit
barriers, and exit outcomes, and will discuss some
topics that go beyond our current knowledge and
which deserve more attention from research and
practice.
Defining theDomain
Business exit belongs to a variety of transactionsthat can all be summarized under the headlinecorporate restructuring (Bowman & Singh,
1993; Schendel, 1993; Singh, 1993). Restructur-
ing via divestitures and acquisitions, for example,
is typically a response to changing internal and/or
external circumstances and aims at enhancing
firm performance. It frequently entails modifica-
tions of corporate strategy, e.g., in terms of refo-
cusing or core change, and thus has a strategic
dimension (Burgelman, 1994, 1996; Byerly, Lam-
ont, & Keasler, 2003; Hayward & Shimizu, 2006;
Zajac & Kraatz, 1993).
Business exit can occur in different modes. A
popular distinction is that between sell-off and
dissolution (e.g., Harrigan, 1982; Mitchell, 1994).
Sell-off means that a business is sold as an indi-
vidual operating unit to another owner (Mata &
Portugal, 2000; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005).
Figure1
NumberofBusiness Exits in theU.S. 1989–2005
Data were adopted from Mergers & Acquisitions: The Dealermaker’s Journal, M&A Almanac section 1989–2005.
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Under the heading of sell-off, there are several
sub-types of exit styles: for example, spin-offs, buy-
outs, carve-outs, and asset sales. A spin-off in-
volves the sale of equity shares of a business to the
parent firm’s current shareholders. In a manage-
ment buy-out a business is sold to its former man-
agement that hence becomes its new owner. A
leveraged buy-out means that a business is sold to
an investor group which typically includes the
sold unit’s former managers. A carve-out is a sale
of a business unit to new shareholders or another
firm (Makhija, 2004; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983;
Woo, Willard, & Daellenbach, 1992). An asset
sale means that a firm agrees to sell all or certain
assets and liabilities to a buying company.
Thereby the corporate entity in question is not
transferred to the buyer. Asset sales are preferable
when management needs to raise funds but alter-
native sources of financing are too expensive
(Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995).
Dissolution involves the shut-down of entire
businesses (Mitchell, 1994; Chang & Singh, 1999;
Mata & Portugal, 2000). In contrast to the afore-
mentioned exit styles, the entity in question does
not get a new owner but disappears. Such a step is
difficult “because labor unions’ contracts must be
satisfied in dismissal, customers must be persuaded
to substitute other products, the trade must accept
the firm’s explanation concerning why the com-
pany is unable to cover particular needs of the
customer, and the value of untold millions of
dollars invested in competitive positioning can
never be recovered if no buyer for the business
unit can be found” (Harrigan, 1982, p. 729). Dis-
solution can occur through formal bankruptcy if a
private debt restructuring is not possible (Gilson,
1990; Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990) or through
delisting from a stock exchange (Baker &
Kennedy, 2002).
There is evidence (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuel-
son, 1988) that entry patterns and subsequent
exits are interrelated. For example, diversifying
firms that enter an industry with a new plant are
generally initially larger and less likely to fail than
are other types of entrants. Hence firm size at the
entry stage seems to be crucial to survival. Yet a
large number of small-sized firms can be found at
every stage in the industry life-cycle because the
large amount of small firms in virtually every
industry reflects an ongoing process of entry into
industries and not the survival of a constant pop-
ulation of small firms over a long time period
(Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994). Findings by
Baker and Kennedy (2002) illustrate this continu-
ing process of entry and exit. Their investigation
of a population of 7,455 firms in the 1963-1995
time period shows that the difference between
annual entry and exit rates is small (6.66% versus
5.11% on average). Thus: “entry and exit seem to
be part of a process of change in which large
numbers of new firms displace large numbers of
older firms without changing the total number of
firms in operation at any given time by very
much” (Geroski, 1995, p. 424).
AntecedentsofBusiness Exit
The antecedents of business exit refer to thequestion of what drives corporate managers topursue business exit. Four clusters of anteced-
ents can be distinguished, namely performance,
strategy, governance, and environment.
Performance
Both underperformance at the firm and the busi-
ness unit level are antecedents of business exit.
Poor firm performance or financial distress is fre-
quently a result of a failed diversification strategy.
Divesting firms aim at reducing costs and thus
consolidating their operations (Duhaime &
Grant, 1984; Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001; Mont-
gomery & Thomas, 1988). Underperformance
does not only determine the exit decision per se
but also the type of exit chosen, e.g., financially
distressed parent firms in terms of inability to
cover interest expenses are more likely to use
sell-off than spin-off due to the need to generate
liquidity in order to meet short-term financial
obligations (Nixon, Roenfeldt, & Sicherman,
2000).
Unmet expectations regarding sales or profit,
market share, and disappointing profit and de-
mand growth rates at the business unit level as
well as the relatively low size of a unit in question
also play a key role for the decision to divest a
business (Chang, 1996). Divested units are likely
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to have been incorporated into the selling firm
through acquisition rather than through internal
development. Particularly in capital-intensive in-
dustries failing businesses are likely to be divested.
In some cases exit is an adequate solution when
performance is poor even though markets are ac-
tually viable (Hamilton & Chow, 1993; Karakaya,
2000; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991; Shimizu &
Hitt, 2005).
In general, firms which are delisting from stock
exchanges lose a large portion of their market
value over a ten-year period preceding this inci-
dent but regain a certain amount of this loss in the
last year before delisting. Firms that exit due to
takeover almost fully regain their losses in the year
before the incident, whereas firms that are being
delisted due to bankruptcy steadily continue los-
ing value in the last year prior to exit (Baker &
Kennedy, 2002). Financial distress frequently re-
sults in bankruptcy but many firms successfully
resist it and restructure their debt privately. There
is evidence that formal bankruptcy is more likely
to be avoided, if, e.g., a relatively high portion of
debt is owed to banks. Banks are better skilled in
renegotiating debt. In addition, it is easier to re-
negotiate debt privately, when there are only few
distinct classes of debt outstanding (Gilson et al.,
1990).
Business unit size determines the exit decision.
Size in conjunction with poor firm-level perfor-
mance has a strong impact on the exit decision per
se and the choice of the exit style. The larger the
unit the higher the likelihood of spin-off as com-
pared to sell-off, because the lower the likelihood
of its failure as a stand-alone entity (Nixon et al.,
2000). Furthermore, unrelated acquisitions tend
to be divested when they fail to meet expectations
that were prevailing at the time of their acquisi-
tion (Bergh, 1997). In addition, some studies con-
firm that the older a business, the less likely is exit
(e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan, 1992; Freeman,
Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), while others provide
evidence that this relation is more complex and
depends on additional factors (e.g., Amburgey,
Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Barnett, 1990). There-
fore, Chang and Singh (1999) argue that age does
not affect the exit decision per se but the choice of
exit mode. Drawing on the resource-based view,
they show that modes of entry (acquisition versus
internal development) and modes of exit (sell-off
versus dissolution) are interrelated. An acquired
business is more likely to be sold off than an
internally developed one. The latter, on the other
hand, is dissolved due to its idiosyncratic resources
that it has developed over time and which are a
strong impediment to sell-off at the time of with-
drawal. Such a business, which is typically an
older unit, tends to be highly integrated with the
other parts of the firm so it cannot easily be
repackaged for sale. Due to its highly firm-specific
assets it is not possible to achieve a high sell-off
price. The latter might even be lower than the
dissolution price. In contrast to Mitchell (1994),
Chang and Singh (1999) find support for this
argumentation. Mata and Portugal (2000), analyz-
ing the entry and post-entry strategies of more
than 1,000 foreign-owned firms in Portugal from
1983 and 1989, corroborate this result.
A unit’s resource endowment is hence crucial
for its fate. The redeployability of assets, e.g.,
drives the extent to which a firm loses value
before delisting. Firms whose assets are more likely
to be redeployed and which are small lose less
value before disappearance than firms character-
ized by resources which are less likely to be rede-
ployed and larger in size (Baker & Kennedy,
2002). In a similar vein, empirical findings by
Villalonga and McGahan (2005) shed new light
on the likelihood of divestiture as compared to
alliances. In this study a firm’s technological re-
sources are significantly related to the choice of
both acquisitions over alliances and alliances over
divestitures. Further, they are a stronger driver of
the decision between boundary-contracting
choices (alliances versus divestitures) than bound-
ary-spanning modes (acquisitions versus alli-
ances). Thus units may also be discarded because of
their endowment with promising resources and
capabilities.2
Strategy
Some diversified firms divest businesses due to a
lack of fit with corporate strategy or current op-
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us into this direction.
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erations that are simultaneously pursued. Busi-
nesses may be too diverse and thus impede effec-
tive interunit communication and cooperation
(Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001). Those that are char-
acterized by few synergies and low interdepen-
dency with peer and subordinate units are more
likely to be divested than those with closer rela-
tionships (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Montgomery
& Thomas, 1988).
In addition, commitments to resources for dif-
ferent purposes can cause problems, if these re-
sources are scarce. A firm can use gains from its
core business or other profitable units but these
resource commitments may harm the whole cor-
poration. In the 1960s, Thorn EMI, e.g., rein-
vested its gains from its core business, the music
division, in less profitable newly acquired busi-
nesses from very different industries. So, nearly all
businesses in this firm suffered from a lack of funds
that they could use for their own purposes.
A unit’s resource requirements may also be
viewed as too high even though it is profitable.
The Pactiv Corporation, a specialty-packaging
firm, e.g., decided on exiting from its highly prof-
itable aluminum business. In contrast to the other
businesses in the company, this unit was coping
with a very volatile market. The resources that
were released as a result of the exit were needed by
other units which offered better growth prospects
for the future. Further resource commitments to
the aluminum business would have been value-
destroying for the whole firm (Dranikoff et al.,
2002; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Kaiser &
Stouraitis, 2001; Karakaya, 2000).
Resource needs must also be judged with regard
to unit size: if the management time that a small
business requires is considered too long as com-
pared to the value it generates for the whole firm,
the likelihood that this business will be eliminated
increases, especially when top management is
hardly familiar with its operations. Furthermore,
top managers seem to be less interested in com-
mitting further resources to small units than to
larger ones when they get into trouble or when a
small business unit’s performance data are hardly
distinguishable from aggregate division perfor-
mance data (Duhaime & Baird, 1987).
CorporateGovernance
Shareholders’ pressure for a high degree of corpo-
rate control may be realized by a decrease of the
firm’s diversification level. Business exits may re-
sult in refocusing and hence better governance. A
high level of diversification frequently leads to
managerial control loss and inefficiencies in a
corporation, especially when it is operating in
uncertain environments. Thus, divestitures in
terms of sell-off are likely. Blockholder ownership
has a strong impact on a firm’s exit intensity,
because it can impede value-destroying diversifi-
cation strategies which are pursued by corporate
managers whose primary aim is to increase their
power. In particular in the 1980s restructuring was
used to decrease too high diversification levels and
was preceded by takeover threats. To avoid them,
corporate managers can consider exit as a strategic
option, especially if it occurs because a firm is
trading at a diversification discount (Gibbs, 1993;
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Hoskisson
& Turk, 1990; Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001). Fur-
thermore, customers may be confused by a firm’s
portfolio of businesses which may simultaneously
act as customers and market competitors. Conse-
quently, AT&T, e.g., decided on de-diversifying
(Dranikoff et al., 2002).
Executive turnover frequently coincides with
exit because its necessity is often not obvious to
the current management. The arrival of a new
CEO increases the likelihood of divestiture of a
poorly performing unit, especially when his/her
power and cognitive orientations favor such a
step. In particular, non-routine executive succes-
sion processes nurture business exit. Similarly,
CEOs coming from outside or with tenure of less
than ten years are more likely to make incisive
strategic decisions than those with longer tenure
because they are better able to resist inertial forces
(Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Hayward & Shimizu,
2006; Matthyssens & Pauwels, 2000; Ravenscraft
& Scherer, 1991; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Wier-
sema, 1995). The situation is different for firms
that need to divest but are solvent and those that
are financially distressed and even fear bank-
ruptcy. Especially in the latter firms, management
turnover is often initiated by bank lenders. During
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the process of private debt restructuring in an
effort to avoid bankruptcy it is common to replace
the CEO and members of the board. As compared
to the situation in poorly performing firms which
are not in default or filing for Chapter 11, man-
agement turnover rates are much lower (Gilson,
1989, 1990).
A further reason for exit is the owner’s retire-
ment, especially in small and family-owned com-
panies. In many cases a successor cannot be found.
Another problem occurs when the owner dies and
his/her heirs are not able to pay the taxes due and
are therefore forced to dissolve a business in order
to raise cash (Karakaya, 2000, p. 658).
Environment
Exit patterns differ across industries and regions
due to different demand and cost conditions, e.g.,
industries in the U.S. with higher than average
entry rates also show higher than average exit
rates (Dunne et al., 1988; Foster, Haltiwanger, &
Krizan, 2005). Mulherin and Boone (2000), e.g.,
demonstrate that, while most firms in the chem-
ical industry were engaged in at least one divesti-
ture in the 1990-1999 period, companies in other
industries, e.g., grocery stores, securities brokerage,
and toiletries/cosmetics, virtually did not divest.
A study of U.S. manufacturing plants from 1972-
1992 shows that in a country accumulating skill
and capital, regions with rapidly changing factor
endowments have both higher entry and exit
rates. Low-skill and labor-intensive plants in re-
gions which are rapidly enlarging their capital
stocks are more likely to shut down than high-skill
and capital-intensive plants in the same regions
(Bernard & Jensen, 2001).
Environmental uncertainty can be another fa-
cilitator of business exit. Increasing uncertainty
enhances the costs and lowers the benefits of
managing a multitude of businesses under a single
corporate umbrella. Retaining unrelated units
generates costs that could be avoided by divesting
them. Bergh (1998) however refutes this presump-
tion. In his study on 168 Fortune 500 firms and
their restructuring activities from 1985 to 1991,
product-market uncertainty is positively but non-
significantly related to the divestiture of unrelated
businesses and not associated with the divestiture
of related businesses. In this context uncertainty
also promotes the acquisition of related business-
es—a finding that can be explained by the ex-
pected strategic and cooperative synergies among
business units. Yet, that uncertainty is also posi-
tively associated with unrelated acquisitions runs
counter to our expectations. This may mean that
corporate managers tend to spread risks in the
presence of uncertainty instead of reducing them
by concentrating on related competences.
Institutional investors and financial analysts
can exert strong influence on corporate managers’
willingness to restructure. Since the mid-1980s
they have become increasingly influential (Bethel
& Liebeskind, 1993). Zuckerman’s (2000) study
on the analysts’ impact on the de-diversification
intensity of large conglomerates from 1985 to
1994 illustrates that corporate parents are fre-
quently forced to restructure their firms in order to
avoid conglomerate discounts. These “illegitimacy
costs” occur because highly diversified firms ren-
der valuation through securities analysts difficult.
This valuation draws on product categories which
conglomerates do not match.
Barriers toBusiness Exit
Despite clear signals to managers that discard-ing a business is economically reasonable,many firms often wait too long. Thus, the
instant photography company Polaroid, e.g., failed
to establish itself in the digital market and could
not avoid bankruptcy in 2001 (Horn, Lovallo &
Viguerie, 2006). Although business exit can be an
appropriate strategy, some structural, strategic, and
managerial barriers may constrain that step (Por-
ter, 1976).
Structural (or Economic) ExitBarriers
Structural barriers refer to a business unit’s re-
sources including its technology, fixed capital, and
labor force: “The more durable the assets are, the
more specific they are to the particular industry, the
particular company or the particular location, the
less likely it will pay to sell off or shut down an
unprofitable business, and the larger the immedi-
ate loss the firm will face if it does shut down the
business” (Porter, 1976, p. 22). Other structural
factors such as ownership concentration in com-
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bination with size and relatedness of units deter-
mine business exit. Integrating agency theory and
the resource-based view of the firm, Bergh (1995)
highlights the importance of the size and related-
ness characteristics of business units sold by their
parent firms. In the presence of high ownership
concentration the likelihood that large and re-
lated businesses are sold decreases. Furthermore,
corporate managers sometimes tend to hold on to
underperforming units as long as a focal unit’s
poor operating performance can be hidden by the
satisfactory performance of the firm’s remaining
units. Examining the 50 largest divestitures in the
U.S. between 1983 and 1987, Cho and Cohen
(1997) demonstrate that firms do not divest busi-
ness units until they experience significant under-
performance at the firm level relative to their
industry counterparts, i.e., as soon as the firm as a
whole is underperforming, the unit in question
can no longer be hidden and is finally divested.
Firms trying to reap at least some benefits often
reconfigure a business by recombining it with
other existing units before finally abandoning it.
Such an attempt that aims at enhancing effective-
ness and/or efficiency or seizing new opportunities
to use resources in an innovative manner increases
a business unit’s longevity and successfully deters
exit (Karim, 2006).
Shimizu and Hitt (2005) consider inertia as
another constraining factor which impedes the
divestiture of a poorly performing acquired unit.
In this study, inertia is measured in terms of an
organization’s combined size and age. When unit
performance is low and simultaneously inertia is
high, exit is less likely. Exit is also less likely when
both unit performance and divestiture experience
are low. When unit performance is low, the like-
lihood of exit is much higher for smaller units
than for bigger ones. Furthermore, divestiture is
less likely when unit performance is low but de-
clining in small amounts or even improving.
Hence, inertia can impede an economically sound
change through exit. However, in some contexts
change can be disadvantageous. For instance,
change in terms of technical innovation can be
either beneficial or detrimental to survival in the
presence of inertia. Findings from the automobile
industry illustrate that the larger a firm, the more
likely a technical innovation will momentarily
increase its likelihood to fail because—especially
in large organizations—the benefits of change are
outweighed by the costs that it entails (Carroll &
Teo, 1996).
Strategic ExitBarriers
Strategic barriers concern potential interdepen-
dencies between business units which might dis-
courage exit. The higher the degree of comple-
mentarity and interrelatedness of businesses, the
less beneficial is exit even in case of performance
problems. Those interrelationships concern re-
source sharing among businesses, e.g., common
sales and distribution channels, as well as vertical
integration, e.g., internal supply relationships
(Porter, 1976).
Harrigan’s (1980) study reveals that businesses
which are highly strategically important are diffi-
cult to be withdrawn due to the value created by
non-capital investments, e.g., in high quality
product reputation. A strong bargaining position
of customers and technological or production-re-
lated impediments also deter exit. Losses encour-
age exit of declining businesses of minor strategic
importance, but other structural contingencies
may even exert a stronger influence, such as phys-
ical facilities which are shared with other non-
declining business units, and market advantages
created by previous distribution relationships, ad-
vertising and promotional campaign expenditures.
Neither the strategically important nor less impor-
tant businesses are as likely to be divested if the
industry is declining, as long as the particular
customer niche which the firm services is ex-
pected to remain viable for a certain time to come.
Managerial ExitBarriers
Managerial barriers are likely to exert a less im-
portant influence on exit than structural and stra-
tegic constraints. They refer to decision-making
processes and either result from information asym-
metries or conflicting goals. Information-related
barriers arise, e.g., when corporate management
cannot distinguish unit performance data from
aggregate financial data. Conflicting goals may
exist because exit is a decision which managers
tend to avoid or due to their strong identification
2007 47Decker and Mellewigt
with a business that has been part of a firm for
many years (Nargundkar, Karakaya, & Stahl,
1996; Porter, 1976; Wiersema, 1995).
Exit is also likely to be deterred when synergy
effects are overestimated, especially in the case of
a divestiture of a related business. Stockholders
also play an important role in exit decisions: since
exit frequently leads to falling stock prices in the
short run, corporate managers are likely to deter it
even though it is economically reasonable and
likely to assure profits in the long run. Instead,
managers continue committing resources to a
business in question in order to rescue it. Such an
attempt may be much more costly and value-
destroying in the long run than an early exit. GM,
e.g., has been waiting to reap profits from Saturn,
a small-car division, for more than 20 years,
though the repeated investment of billions of dol-
lars since its launch in 1985 has not helped reverse
the disappointing situation (Horn et al., 2006).
The deterrence of exit can be an outcome of
escalating commitment which effectively deters
necessary exit decisions. Thereby, CEO tenure
can act as a strong impediment because longer
tenure leads to a higher reluctance to change the
strategic status quo (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002;
Matthyssens & Pauwels, 2000; Ross & Staw,
1993).
OutcomesofBusiness Exit
Business exit has an impact on firm strategy,employees, managers and owners, firm perfor-mance, and the unit that has been abandoned.
Changeof FirmStrategy
Business exit can be pursued either proactively,
i.e., as part of a firm’s long-term strategy for cor-
porate development, or reactively, i.e., after a per-
formance decline. Proactive exits aim at achieving
strategic change. Empirical evidence reveals that
restructuring can trigger, e.g., alterations in re-
source allocations and commitment or shifts in
the organization of production systems (Robins,
1993; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). The Intel Corpora-
tion which exited from the dynamic random ac-
cess memory (DRAM) business in 1984-1985 and
transformed itself from a “memory” company into
a “microcomputer” company is an example of a
business exit involving strategic change. Intel rec-
ognized that resource shifting and technological
uncoupling were value-added activities because
they released scarce resources from businesses in
which the firm’s strategic position was weak, thus
helping to dissolve the strategic context of those
businesses within the corporation (Burgelman,
1994, 1996).
The withdrawal of businesses can entail a
change of corporate diversification (Byerly et al.,
2003). The decision to restructure Thorn EMI,
e.g., was accompanied by a fundamental alteration
of the firm’s diversification level. As mentioned
before, after decades of investing in very diverse
and frequently unprofitable businesses, in 1985
the conglomerate Thorn EMI decided to focus on
only its core music activities that promised high
profits and global potential (Kaiser & Stouraitis,
2001). A more recent example for refocusing is
the German company Linde, a leading industrial
gas and engineering company, which transformed
itself from a conglomerate into a company mainly
concentrating on industrial gases.
Impact onEmployees,Management, and
Ownership Structure
Exits and layoffs are interrelated. They threaten
the employees’ careers and sometimes even their
entire existences. Thus business exit causes uncer-
tainty and fear among employees, and some may
even consider it as a betrayal and react aggres-
sively (Brockner, Grover, O’Malley, Reed, &
Glynn, 1993; Capron, Mitchell, & Swaminathan,
2001; Dranikoff et al., 2002; Nees, 1981; Reilly,
Brett, & Stroh, 1993). It even affects the remain-
ing employees after the incident. Under the threat
of further layoffs, “survivors” who are character-
ized by low self-esteem more frequently tend to
feel worried and develop a high work motivation
in order to compensate their fears. Surviving man-
agers are likely to react with alterations in their
attitudes towards their careers and organizations,
job involvement, and satisfaction with job secu-
rity. Yet, some managers remaining with the sold
business under a new owner’s leadership feel lib-
erated, as the unit may benefit from the more
appropriate expertise that the new parent is offer-
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ing to it (Brockner et al., 1993; Dranikoff et al.,
2002; Reilly et al., 1993).
In financially distressed firms executive turn-
over can be both an antecedent and an outcome
of exit (Gilson, 1990). The incumbent manage-
ment and the board of directors frequently lose
control which is usually assumed by non-manage-
ment blockholders and creditors. The percentage
of common stock owned by blockholders and
creditors increases. The banks’ influence also
grows due to contractual agreements on restruc-
tured bank loans. Furthermore, managers fre-
quently experience difficulty in finding new em-
ployment for at least three years following their
resignation (Gilson, 1989). Bankruptcy or default
can result in changes in managerial compensation
and incentive systems. Findings from 77 public
firms that either filed for bankruptcy or privately
renegotiated debt loans in the 1980s illustrate that
these firms simultaneously restructured their in-
centive systems and thus strengthened the link
between compensation and firm performance
(Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993).
FirmPerformance
Increases in firm performance may be the most
important outcomes of business exit (Chang,
1996; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988). Both high
and low performing firms tend to undertake exit
but less profitable ones experience more pressure
from stock markets to do so. For instance, only the
announcement of DaimlerChrysler’s CEO Dieter
Zetsche to consider a sell-off of Chrysler as a
strategic option led to an increase of the firm’s
stock price of more than 10 percent within five
days (Meck, 2007).
The exit-performance relationship may be
moderated by several factors. Sell-offs, e.g., seem
to have little impact on post-restructuring perfor-
mance unless they go along with gains in focus,
price announcements, or distribution of revenues
to stockholders. Returns are highest when the
earnings of sales are used to reduce debt or give
special dividends to shareholders (Bowman,
Singh, Useem, & Badhury, 1999; Markides, 1992;
Steiner, 1997). Also, sell-offs which are associated
with an increase in focus are positively related to
performance enhancements in the three years fol-
lowing the divestiture. Stock price reactions are
better for focus-increasing than for other divesting
firms (John & Ofek, 1995). Referring to refocus-
ing, Markides (1992) demonstrates that the rela-
tionship between diversification and firm profit-
ability is curvilinear, i.e., lower levels of
diversification are positively related to profitabil-
ity, and after exceeding the optimal degree the
relation turns negative. In a further study,
Markides (1995) strongly supports the prediction
that the refocusing initiatives that were pursued
by over-diversified firms in the 1980s led to high
profitability improvements. Chang (1996) empir-
ically confirms that exit produces higher profit-
ability in terms of return on asset (ROA) and
operating cash flow (OCF).
Performance effects of shutdowns are different:
since liquidations signal serious problems, the ad-
vance notice of a closing has a negative effect on
stock performance. The longer the time span be-
tween advance notice and shutdown the worse
the effect on the performance of a firm’s stock,
since stockholders fear that the negative effect on
cash flow gets even worse the longer the plant is
kept (Clineball & Clineball, 1994).
Referring to spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and
asset sales, Mulherin and Boone (2000) show that,
in general, the 370 divestitures in their sample
from the 1990-1999 period create value in terms
of the average net-of-market return (3.04%). In
this study the mean abnormal return is 4.51% for
spin-offs, 2.27% for equity carve-outs, and 2.60 %
for asset sales. The generally positive effect on
market performance is in line with prior and sub-
sequent evidence on the outcomes of spin-offs
(e.g., Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983), asset sales (e.g.,
Lang et al., 1995), and equity carve-outs (e.g.,
Vijh, 2002).The positive effect of spin-offs can
differ with regard to spin-off unit size. Large spin-
offs result in a stronger positive effect on share-
holder wealth than smaller ones (Miles & Rosen-
feld, 1983). Particularly firms with high levels of
information asymmetry in the market about the
cash flows and operating efficiency of their busi-
ness units benefit from spin-offs, which signifi-
cantly contribute to the reduction of information
asymmetry (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam,
1999). Size also determines the effects of sell-offs:
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larger sell-offs lead to larger share day price re-
sponses (Klein, 1986).
Also, divestitures of subsidiaries in more devel-
oped countries cause more favorable valuation
effects than those of units in emerging economies
because the markets for divested assets in under-
developed settings are less competitive than in
industrialized countries. Consequently, selling
prices tend to be discounted (Borde, Madura, &
Akhigbe, 1998). Moreover, positive effects on
market performance will not occur if external
markets are not well-functioning. Makhija
(2004), analyzing 988 Czech firms from an agency
and transaction cost perspective, shows that in
contrast to the positive effect of restructuring on
U.S. firms, on average, it adversely affects firm
values in the Czech economy. Very likely, this
negative effect is due to the loss of capital-related
benefits as well as to inferior external product and
labor markets in emerging economies.
Consequences for theDivestedBusinessUnit
Woo et al. (1992) suggest that the performance of
spin-off units will improve after divestiture due to
decreased agency costs and higher flexibility with
regulators. According to them, the performance of
related businesses will be higher than that of un-
related ones because related units face higher bu-
reaucratic costs than unrelated ones. Both as-
sumptions were not empirically supported: the
performance of both related and unrelated units
did not increase and even tended to decline after
spin-off. Intuitively it appears reasonable that
business performance will improve after exit. This
is particularly true when a business is held by a
parent whose skills and resources do not match
the unit’s special requirements in different stages
of its life cycle and is hence unable to add value to
that business. Another parent firm may hence be
more beneficial (Dranikoff et al., 2002).
Outcomes at the business level can also consist
of managerial improvements. Seward and Walsh
(1996), investigating the post-restructuring inter-
nal control practices in 78 voluntary corporate
spin-offs between 1972 and 1987, reveal that
spun-off businesses are characterized by efficient
internal controls: they are led by an inside CEO
from the formerly combined firm, who receives a
performance-related and market-based compensa-
tion, and their boards of directors and their com-
pensation committees are dominated by outsiders.
Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to ana-lyze the fragmented literature on business exitfrom the prior three decades. The table in the
appendix gives an overview on the empirical ev-
idence reported here. Our knowledge can be sum-
marized in three clusters:
(1) Factors promoting business exit: Underperfor-
mance at the firm and the business level, a
lack of strategic fit and/or focus, a lack of
resources, over-diversification, executive
turnover, blockholder ownership, takeover
threats, and environmental factors such as
industry, uncertainty, and the institutional
setting enhance the likelihood of business
exit.
(2) Exit barriers: The higher the level of owner-
ship concentration, the lower the likelihood
of divestiture of related and large businesses.
Inertia, a lack of exit experience, a relatively
high unit size, and a stepwise business perfor-
mance decline act as slowly progressing bar-
riers to exit. The attempt to reconfigure a
business, strong inter-unit complementarities
and a high strategic importance of a business
in question as well as information asymme-
tries, conflicting goals, and escalating com-
mitment impede business exit.
(3) Exit outcomes: Business exit can lead to
changes in resource allocation, production
systems, and corporate diversification. It is
frequently accompanied by layoffs, as well as
changes in the employees’ attitudes and be-
havior, management, and ownership struc-
ture. The mainly positive exit-performance
relationship is moderated by factors such as
strategic focus, prior performance, and market
development. The benefits for a divested
business consist of financial and managerial
improvements.
A look beyond these findings reveals that in con-
trast to the business exits undertaken in the 1980s
and 1990s nowadays multibusiness firms are much
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less diversified. Exits can hence no longer be con-
sidered as an outcome of de-conglomeration ef-
forts. The necessity for and the circumstances
under which they occur seem to have changed.
Both divestitures and acquisitions are used as com-
ponents of sustainable restructuring strategies
which aim to change a corporation’s strategic di-
rection and internal configuration. Villalonga and
McGahan (2005, p. 1183) point out that those
different strategic options should rather be re-
garded in conjunction than in isolation because
whether firm size is enlarged through acquisitions
or alliances or shrunk through divestitures or al-
liances only depends on a firm’s perspective. In
line with them and Capron et al. (2001), Karim
(2006) summarizes a firm’s asset restructuring ac-
tivities under the term ‘reconfiguration.’ Adopting
a multi-theoretical perspective and concentrating
on the medical sector, she draws on a sample of
250 firms comprising a total of 866 units and
1,274 product lines between 1978-1997. She con-
siders a type of dissolution that has not attracted
attention from restructuring research before,
namely the dissolution of a business unit into
another one in the same corporation. Acquired
businesses are frequently dissolved in internally
created ones or combined together with other
acquired units. This internal reconfiguration de-
lays exit because units that have been reconfig-
ured internally at least once are kept longer than
those that have never been subject to those ef-
forts. Internal reconfiguration prior to exit seems
to be beneficial to corporations and should be
treated in further studies.
Karim’s study illustrates that considerable
progress could be made towards a more complete
perspective on business exit if further issues re-
flecting current trends in management were con-
sidered. For instance, the question of which type
of buyer is involved is hardly dealt with, although
executives who are preoccupied with finding a
buyer for a business unit hint at differences be-
tween strategic buyers, e.g., acquiring firms from
the same industry, and financial investors. Deals
involving financial investors have gained popular-
ity in recent years. Current trends predict that
their number will be further increasing (Rosen-
bloom, 2005). Their motivation is mainly profit-
oriented and different from that of strategic buyers
who rather consider the acquisition of a business
as an opportunity to promote synergies or increase
their market share. They are hence likely to pay a
higher price for a business unit than financial
investors. The popular business press gives exam-
ples for the involvement of financial investors in
business exits. Financial investors have become
increasingly influential acquirers, for example, in
Germany. Examples are Stinnes and its abandon-
ment of Brenntag and Interfer, and Thyssen-
Krupp’s divestiture of Berkenhoff and its vehicle
cast business. Future research should consider this
trend.
Overall, it is the intention of this paper to
highlight the importance of business exit for re-
search and practice. Knowing what we know
about business exits and their high financial value
we should bear in mind that exit need not mean
failure but a new beginning for a corporation, as
General Electric under Jack Welch illustrates. By
further enhancing our knowledge on business exit
and its interconnection with other restructuring
activities, we may be able to give credence to
Anslinger, Klepper, and Subramaniam’s (1999)
claim that “breaking up is good to do.”
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